Tag Archives: Russia

Letters from America (II): Unite to thrive

Ambition, innovation and flexibility (see my previous op-ed in the Letters from America series entitled “Where the sky is the limit”) also characterize the US when it comes to politics, including international politics. In this op-ed I focus on the role of the US on the global stage and compare it with that of the EU, to the extent that the two are comparable.

In the post-World War II world the US has been the undisputable leader most of the time, certainly in the West. Its predominance may have been challenged by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but its ultimate triumph and the dissolution of the Soviet bloc confirmed the superiority of the US. At the one universal organization, the United Nations (UN), the US occupies one of five permanent seats with veto power. There and beyond its superiority in terms of hard (military, economic, political) and soft (cultural, innovation-al) power, its social and administrative cohesion and drive for achievement distinguish it from the emerging superpower of China, a defensive Russia, and the long-declining former colonial powers of France and the UK.

A European patriot, if one exists, would rejoice in the fact of EU “double occupancy” at the core of the UN Security Council. Caution is in order, though. While the US is a unitary actor, to the extent that is possible for such a complex state, the UK and France certainly do not want to surrender their Security Council prerogatives to any joint EU decision-making. To make things worse, among the elected ten members of the Security Council at least one and often two are also EU members. Four votes out of fifteen? That would be a great deal for the EU. Well, forget it, it is four different sets of policies and interests, no matter what lip service is paid to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Of course, interests often coincide and that is reflected in frequently concurring European votes. That, however, is not part of really joint strategic planning that involves the European institutions. Let the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, these days Ms. Mogherini, say what she wants; the ultimate interests are defined at the national level by the corresponding national elites.

While the US formulates strategies through its National Security Council and its Departments of State, Defence, Treasury, Energy, etc., the EU struggles to formulate common positions through protracted negotiations of its 28 member states, plus the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS, headed by the High Representative). By the time the Europeans have managed to reach agreement among themselves in the margins of UN negotiation processes the other countries of the world have moved on, with the European position having less of the impact that it could have.

European money is welcomed for development and humanitarian assistance by a large part of the world, but no leadership is expected or sought from the EU. The standard leader and trend-setter remains the US, whether loved or resented. Increasingly, China is emerging as a leader too, individually or in the context of groups that it belongs to, notably the Group of 77 and the BRICS. A “dual hegemony” thus seems to be taking shape at the global level, with the US and China as the two leading powers, the “G2”. One would expect that the other emerging power, the EU, with its more than 500 million inhabitants (the US population is about 320 million) and the biggest economy collectively in the world, to be part of the core group, part of a “G3”, but that is not the case.

One would expect the EU, with its more than 500 million inhabitants and the biggest economy collectively in the world, to be part of a “G3” of leading global powers, together with the US and China, but that is not the case.

In fact, this is not the case even on climate change, where the EU is broadly acknowledged to be taking bold steps. The large greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for 2030 announced by the EU in October 2014 were less imagination-grabbing and relevant to global policy than the joint November 2014 announcement by the US and China of their corresponding, more modest but coordinated measures. Discreet but targeted actions taken in tandem by the G2 also played a major role in saving the recent UN climate change conference in Lima (December 2014), compared to a respected but rather marginal role played by the EU.

It should be pointed out, in all fairness, that individual EU states like the UK or the Nordic countries often demonstrate more leadership and have more impact than the EU as a whole, despite their limited resources. These countries, however, operate in a second or third tier around the US, China and even other major developing or middle-income countries, when acting alone. A core problem for the EU is that there is no defined common European interest, and actually no effort is being made to define it in a strategic way for the medium and long-term beyond declaratory generalities. Not that such an exercise is “a piece of cake” for the US, which has its own internal divisions and dysfunctional elements. In the case of the US, though, there is enough common discussion, vision and empowered central institutions that make rational planning possible and mobilize sufficient resources to execute it.

The clarity of the US interest in the case of its partnerships over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, from NATO to APEC, as well as in the “Western Hemisphere” (i.e. the Americas), leads to concrete political and economic outcomes. The same cannot necessarily be said for the EU’s policies towards its immediate neighbourhood, which manage to be at the same time intrusive when it comes to the details (strict adoption of the “acquis communautaire”) and politically disjointed on the big picture (see mishandling of Ukrainian case vis-à-vis the country’s internal divisions and Russia).

It should come as no surprise that EU members are steadily losing ground on the charts of state power and influence in the world, overtaken by more dynamic, emerging powers.

The EU’s central institutions seem to be stuck to what 19th Century Europe identified as “mission civilisatrice”, fuelled by an underlying sense of self-righteousness and superiority vis-à-vis others, while individual member states continue to pursue their narrow but concrete geopolitical and economic interests, which go in different directions. With all this, it should come as no surprise that EU members are steadily losing ground on the charts of state power and influence in the world, overtaken by more dynamic, emerging powers. Of course, the US steadily maintains one of the top posts, as would the EU as a whole, should it become really united.

Georgios Kostakos

Originally published as op-ed in Katoikos.eu on 4 February 2015

Irresponsible brinkmanship all around on Ukraine

Worrisome signs of the (re)emergence of a cold war between the West, mainly the US and the EU, and Russia are emerging over the issue of Ukraine. Political rhetoric is being ramped up, along with sanctions gradually introduced on the part of the West, while Crimea’s incorporation into Russia is advancing. It looks increasingly difficult to return to the status quo ante and have a reasonable discussion on how to ensure the integrity, prosperity and good governance of Ukraine in the difficult buffer zone between the EU and Russia where it finds itself.

Barring a major miscalculation from Ukraine, Russia or the West, the most probable is for a new status quo that includes:
– A Crimea that is de facto part of Russia, whether internationally recognized or not;
– A Ukraine run by a pro-Western government but facing outbreaks of violence with parts of the population feeling closer to Russia and with the extreme right making strides in the other parts;
– Frosty relations between Russia and the West, with Russia facing limited sanctions and exclusion from fora like the G7/8, and Europe potentially facing counter sanctions and experiencing energy supply problems.

This may make for a somewhat unpleasant situation but nothing the key protagonists cannot live with, except perhaps Tatars, Ukrainians and other minority populations in Crimea, and Russians in the rest of Ukraine. But the main political players, international and local, can always restate their claims against each other, excite patriotic sentiments among their respective publics and allies, win elections and exercise power, without having to resort to much more than tough words. If no unpredictable factor intervenes, that is, no provocation or public uprising that might demand from politicians to prove their toughness in practice and authorize action. Such an improbable, it must be said again, turn of events that might lead to a hot incident between Russian and Western/NATO forces could have unpredictable consequences for regional and even global peace and security.

To avoid any dramatic eventuality, and to stabilize the situation as much as possible, measures like the following could be taken:
– Swift and systematic moves to establish democratic governance and respect for minority rights in Ukraine, as part of its gradual integration into the broader European space; the EU and the West should strongly discourage right-wing or other excesses, retribution among rival political forces, etc. by setting their avoidance as precondition for any deepening of integration and financial support; organizations like the UN and the OSCE could be brought in to help with or monitor actions in that regard.
– Guarantee of minority rights, assistance with family reunions across the new de facto borders etc. in Crimea too, through similar assistance or monitoring arrangements with the involvement of organizations like the UN and the OSCE.
– Continuation of mutual engagement between Russia, the US and Europe on other issues like Syria, Iran, North Korea, and avoidance of a Cold War-type split in the UN security Council; gradual reinstatement of collaboration fora like the G8.

This would be a far-from-perfect state of affairs, but could be the most viable, because it would entail a pragmatic recognition of mutual interests and might eventually draw the West and Russia closer together. This would presuppose a degree of humility, self-discipline and self-awareness from all sides, with the Russians realizing that they cannot reconstruct their empire with threats and a gradual return to centralized authoritarianism; the US and Europe admitting their hypocrisy and finally learning from the litany of failures they have created by “spreading democracy” around the world, e.g. Iraq and Libya; Europe facing head-on the major handicap of its own divisions that still allow the pursuit of narrow nationalist gains instead of working to define and implement the common European good.

Georgios Kostakos
20 March 2014

 

Disappearance in Ukraine: Looking for the EU under the rubble

The recent dramatic developments in Ukraine have led to the disappearance of its dismissed President Yanukovych, but also to another very apparent disappearance, that of the European Union. The US officials who earlier used a four-letter word to describe Europe’s absence from the scene and inability to put its act together in Ukraine was obviously right. One cannot wait for the dysfunctional Union to act.

Brussels is unable to prove its relevance when it comes to big political issues, the people holding the highest offices in European institutions are mediocre and getting ready to go after the May elections, and the wish of the EU’s most powerful member states is obviously to hold on to their prerogatives; thus the Union appears as disunited and ineffective as ever. There is not even a semblance of EUness in what is happening in terms of Western intervention in Ukraine today. The monitors who will pronounce on the violence and the deaths are British and clearly say so to the press, announcing already their foregone conclusions. Even for monetary assistance, something the EU used to be good at in the past, it is the UK talking to the US and the IMF. The interface with the Russians is fragmented, with Hollande, Merkel and others making calls and sending messages to Putin, while the sad presence of Catherine Ashton moves around Meidan, trying to utter a common EU foreign policy, or is she another member of the UK delegation?

This is as disappointing as it can be, and “one of the same” too. What has changed from 100 years ago, the games of the big powers and the Great War? Very important that the war is not with us this time, but for how long, if such games continue?

For a European federalist like me this is particularly disheartening for many reasons:

  • It is another proof, if one was needed, that the Union is there only for the soft issues, while it breaks up in front of big politics, big interests and big money;
  • It is particularly worrying that parochial national interests and uncooperative national elites continue to play their games around Europe and beyond, competing with each other and undermining the common European project, while being unable to utter a coherent stance towards third parties like Russia or the US;
  • Coming from Greece, the current holder of the EU Presidency as it happens, and the best known example of a punch bag for internal EU discipline, I am triply worried about the weak-to-non-existent role of middle and small powers within Europe, as they should be trying hard to keep the big powers within the fold and the EU institutions up to task…

Another dark day for Europe but will it prove a better day for Ukraine, no matter who has actually intervened and how? The specter of the country’s splitting in two, and of possible civil war, is hovering over it. Will the new leadership, not without a past itself, manage to keep the country together? Will it split peacefully if it does split? Will Europe offer guarantees to Western Ukraine if the split happens? What will Russia do, vis-à-vis Eastern Ukraine and the country as a whole? What a wonderful world, and the Sochi Olympics have just successfully concluded nearby…

Georgios Kostakos

Athens, 25 February 2014

Crunch time for Syria

The statement earlier this month by the leader of the Syrian National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces Moaz al-Khatib that he was ready to negotiate a settlement with members of the Assad government, and the subsequent statement of Prime Minister al-Halqi expressing a similar will from the government side gave reason for hope. However, the now apparent inability of the National Coalition to unite in support of its leader’s statement, in a backdrop of new attacks on Aleppo, as well as on government and opposition installations in Damascus and elsewhere, throw the possibility of any direct peace talks back into doubt. That should not be allowed to happen. Instead, those with any degree of leverage with the Syrian government and the opposition should make clear that the Syrian parties cannot expect any support for their respective interests unless they sit down and talk to each other in earnest.

One positive thing that became evident during the short-lived spell of hope was that there can be broad international support for talks between the opposition and the government. The Russian Foreign Minister’s welcoming of Mr. Al-Khatib’s openness to dialogue should be reciprocated by those closer to the opposition, including the US, UK and France. There is always room for political maneuvering and relative positioning but this should be kept within limits, and should be firmly placed within a framework of talks between the Syrian parties themselves.

Iraq, in particular, should be kept in mind in all this, and the waste of lives and treasure that took place there should be avoided in Syria. In the event of a settlement, or while moving towards one, there should be no blanket demonization and persecution of Baath Party rank-and-file members, civil servants and other professionals. Politics excluded, Syria has been functioning better than many countries in the region in terms of public services and social cohesion, taking also into account that it is not particularly endowed in natural resources like most of its Arab neighbours are. A smooth transition would engage decent elements of the state machinery and would put emphasis on the continuity of public services and the state, with positive openings to those thus far excluded, rather than negative purges and summary replacements.

There are well-based allegations of war crimes committed by the Assad government, as well as by opposition forces. All these allegations should be duly investigated as soon as the situation on the ground allows it, and the culprits should be brought to justice, irrespective of who may have been patronizing them during the conflict. There should be no one-sided victors’ justice, if the situation in Syria is to stabilize for the long term, but responsibilities should be handed down impartially to those to whom they belong.

Responsibility lies with all sides, inside and outside Syria. Crunch time should not be allowed to drift any further, for the sake of the suffering Syrian population more than anything else.

Georgios Kostakos
Brussels, 24 February 2013